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I. Introduction
Much has been written regarding the ability of local governments to provide public goods efficiently. However, most of the literature overlooks the differential effects of the collective choice institutions. In addition, the distribution of voter preferences may enhance or hinder the performance of political institutions. The dynamics between political institutions and voter preferences may greatly effect a local government's ability to leverage its monopoly position in order to extract rents from the constituencies.
The purpose of this paper is to present an agent-based simulation that examines the efficiency of different political institutions with respect to facilitating collective decisions that yield the greatest satisfaction among constituents. In the model, heterogeneous agents select among jurisdictions the one that offers the most satisfactory package of government services.
The previous work of Page (1997, 1998) Upon outlining the capabilities of the extended model and discussing initial results, I examine the feasibility of using a surrogate to gauge the extent to which a local government may exploit its monopoly power. The relative distance between the incumbent party and its closest rival within the issue space is held to be an indirect measure of the political competition within a particular jurisdiction. I examine this measure, termed separation, in terms of its ability to generate understanding of the extent to which a local government may exploit its monopoly.
While other authors have asserted the existence of wedge between competing parties, in the present model this is an emergent phenomenon.
II. A Cursory Review of the Literature
In his seminal paper, Tiebout (1956) argued that, given certain assumptions, the local supply of public goods approaches that expected from a competitive model. "If consumer-voters are fully mobile, the appropriate local governments, whose revenue-expenditure patterns are set, are adopted by the consumer-voters (1956: 424) ." Because of the variety of services and service levels offered by local governments, in concert with constituents' ability to "vote with their feet", local governments' production of public goods will approach the efficient level. Voters will move to localities that offer that package of government services and taxation that fits their preferences. The present paper will examine the extent to which Tiebout's conclusion holds, given a somewhat richer model as well as the relaxation of several of his assumptions -namely, those pertaining to the knowledge levels of local politicians and their abilities and incentives to compete politically for the favor of constituents. Epple and Zelenitz (1981) examine the extent to which institutional rigidities allow localities to behave like monopolies. The authors conclude that given an environment of fixed jurisdictional boundaries, competition among jurisdictions alone does not prevent local governments leveraging their monopoly power. In their model, taxes are raised via property taxation allowing local governments to exploit the immobility of land (1981: 1216) .
Others who have published in the taxation area include Mileszkowski and Zodrow (1989) . The authors examine the differential effects of taxation as it pertains to Tiebout efficiency. They find that under certain circumstances the property tax approximates the nondistortionary head tax implied in Tiebout's model. The authors contrast this with an alternative view that the capital bears the average burden of the tax (1989: 1141). They conclude that the latter view prevails under more plausible circumstances. Arnott and Stiglitz (1979) consider the role of Georgist taxation of land rents and find that if given certain assumptions, differential land rents provide the optimal revenue for public goods.
In a critique of the theory underlying Tiebout's model, Bewley (1981) Dowding, et al (1994) .
More recent contributions to the literature include Nechyba (1997) , who uses a simulation model to examine the interplay between state and local governments, in an environment of economic and political competition. Caplan (2001) formulates a model that shows that Tiebout competition is unable to reduce the monopoly power of local governments at all, due to the presence of tax capitalization which makes it impossible for land owners to move to avoid monopolistic pricing of government services (2001: 1-5 ). In his model, he adds a separation term intended as a sort of devotion to party ideology, which the parties then exploit once in power. The present paper measures the effectiveness with which different voting rules allow for an endogenous level of separation to emerge. A local government that is able to shield itself from the competitive process of constantly offering the mix of services and taxes that most satisfies voters' demands for governance would be able to exercise a certain amount of monopoly power to extract rents from its constituents. As in market transactions, firms that face stiff competition must constantly innovate and strive to please customers, while firms that enjoy a monopoly position are not necessarily under the same constraints. While it is difficult, even in a computational model, to measure the amount of "competition" between and among jurisdictions, a surrogate of platform separation is developed later in this paper.
The key characteristic is that this phenomenon emerges endogeneously.
In Kollman, Miller, and Page (1997) , the authors develop a model intended to measure the ability of different institutions to sort voters with various preferences over the allocation of public goods. Heterogeneous agents are endowed with fixed, linearly separable preferences over a specified number of binary issues. Agents reside in one of a fixed number of jurisdictions, within which political platforms are determined by collective choice using one of the following institutions: democratic referendum, direct competition, or proportional representation.
Jurisdictions select their platforms and resolve the collective choice problem regarding the issues, and agents are then free to move to the jurisdiction that offers them the highest expected utility. Agents are unable to forecast the effects that their presence will have on the platforms selected in jurisdictions to which they may move, which is a key aspect of their bounded rationality.
One of the authors' overarching conclusions is the process through which the agents seek their optimal jurisdiction, and through which the imperfectly informed parties pursue the election winning platform, is significantly more stable than McElvey (1976) findings would suggest. In addition, they find that the order of how well political institutions perform relative to one another (in terms of increasing aggregate utility) in a single jurisdiction setting is generally opposite of how they perform in a multiple jurisdiction setting. Namely, democratic referendum, an institution that provides highly stable outcomes is found to be superior to the other collective choice mechanisms in a single jurisdiction model, followed by direct competition and proportional representation.
When the number of jurisdictions is increased, proportional representation is found to outperform the others. In fact, as the number of jurisdictions increase, so too does the relative ability of proportional representation to sort voters according to their preferences. (Kollman, et al, 1997) This relationship is due to the propensity for unstable political outcomes under PR and direct competition, thus allowing jurisdictions to "break out" of sub-optimal equilibria, with greater regularity than democratic referendum.
In another article Kollman, et al (1998) examine the behavior of adaptive parties who seek electoral victory by evolutionarily changing their platforms in the hopes of increasing their success at the ballot box. Parties lack a complete understanding of voter preferences and must incrementally search in the neighborhood of their current platform in an effort to find the successful platform. Of particular concern is the manner in which voter preferences effect the party's search process. The authors test a number of different combinations of voter ideologies and types of strength distributions. Voters may possess either uniform or consistent preferences, which means their ideal points are distributed randomly, or with a particular bias. The intensities of their preferences may be independent, centrist, or extremist, wherein their intensities for each issue are either uncorrelated, more heavily weighted towards moderate preferences, or more heavily weighted towards extreme ideal points.
The authors show that the electoral landscape formed by voter preferences with respect to the incumbent party's platform varies in terms of ruggedness and slope. Ruggedness is a measure of the relative number of local extrema, while slope is a measure of the magnitude of those extrema. Voters with uniform preferences (i.e. randomly drawn and unbiased) with independent intensities (i.e. uncorrelated strengths of opinion) tend to form landscapes that are the most rugged (1998:153) . Rugged landscapes hinder the ability of the challenger to locate the global optimum that may defeat the incumbent. Consistent preferences with centrist intensities (i.e. biased towards the middle of the spectrum) seem to result in less rugged landscapes which enables party's to quickly converge toward the neighborhood of the median. The present paper attempts to test the robustness of KMP's Tiebout sorting against a number of varied electoral landscapes, as well as extend the analysis to include additional voting institutions. Kollman, Miller, and Page's (1997) model serves as the point of departure for the model presented in this paper. The process to dock this model with the agent-based model implemented in this paper is described in Seagren (2010) . The agent-based model of Tiebout competition is extended to account for the richer electoral landscape framework found in Kollman, et al (1998) .
III. Extending the Model
It is further enhanced to examine additional collective choice mechanisms, as well as a surrogate that measures the intensity of political competition. For the purposes of this analysis, the model is implemented in Java using the Recursive Porous Agent Simulation Toolkit (REPAST).
1 The object oriented computer language and the agent-based toolkit facilitates research of artificial societies comprised of heterogeneous agents such as voters and parties.
Agents and Jurisdictions
In this model heterogeneous agents must select among a fixed set of jurisdictions on the basis of the public policy platform offered in each jurisdiction. Each jurisdiction must give its position on the same, exogenously given number of issues. The platform positions are resolved through the collective choice institution for that jurisdiction. The issues in the platform may correspond to particular levels of any government activity, to include provision of public goods or regulatory levels.
Each agent has linearly separable preferences over each issue. The agents possess a set of ideal points, which characterizes its desired levels of government service for each issue.
Agents also possess a corresponding set of strengths, which characterizes the relative importance of each issue to the voter (Kollman, et al, 1998: 143) . The agents' preferences remain constant throughout the simulation, however, they may be correlated in two ways. Individual voter ideal points may be correlated on different issues, and individuals' strengths may be correlated to their ideal points.
Ideology is term used to describe the manner in which voters' ideal points are correlated. (Kollman, 1998:145) An individual voter may have consistent or uniform ideology. A voter with consistent ideology has ideal points that are correlated across issues, with a bias towards a particular part of the issue spectrum. These ideal points are generated such that a bias point is selected which constrains all ideal points to within plus or minus one unit. For instance, if the bias point generated for a given agent is 2.05, then his ideal points for each issue must be a member of the closed set [1.05, 3.05]. The ideal points for agents with uniform ideology are drawn from a uniform random distribution with no such biases.
An individual agent's ideal points and strengths may be correlated in one of three manners. Centrist strengths are higher for ideal points that are closer to the middle of the distribution. Suppose ideal points are distributed between 0 and 6. Then for centrists, the maximum strength for an issue will be given to ideal points of 3. The strength for an ideal point of 2 will be higher than the strength associated with an ideal point of 1, and so on. Extremist strengths are higher for ideal points that are closer to the extremes. So, in the previous example, ideal points of 3 would have 0 strength, while ideal points of 0 or 6 would be assigned the highest strengths. Independent strengths are randomly and independently distributed so that on average, they are uncorrelated with the underlying ideal points. Combining ideologies and strength distributions yields six potential electoral landscapes of preferences, as shown in Table 1 . These categories are neither exhaustive nor intended to fit actual particular distributions of preferences. They represent polar cases on which to test the performance of political institutions. They do, however, tend to generally correspond to ways in which preferences may be distributed once people decide how to vote. Individuals often feel strongly about divisive issues with relatively polar alternatives such as abortion. While for other Jurisdictional platforms and party platforms remain integer values, as in Kollman (1998 Kollman ( , 1992 for simplicity.
At the beginning of the timestep, each jurisdiction selects its platform of government services according to the particular collective choice institution in effect and the agents that reside within. Agents then evaluate each platform the jurisdictions offer, to include the jurisdiction in which they reside. An individual agent's utility generated by a particular platform is given by:
An agent's utility is the negative of the squared weighted Euclidean distance between the agent's ideal platform and the given platform, where the weights are the agent's strengths on each issue (Kollman, 1998: 143) . Agents possess complete information regarding the level of services offered in all jurisdictions. They move costlessly to the jurisdiction whose platform offers them the highest utility, without any expectation regarding the effect they may have on political outcomes in their prospective jurisdiction. External effects between issues are neglected so voters are assumed to vote sincerely.
The Political Institutions
Kollman (1997) examines the effectiveness of democratic referendum, direct competition, and proportional representation. In this paper, I examine the following collective decision making institutions:
2 Democratic Referendum. A democratic referendum involves a simple majority rule vote on each issue. The outcome is the median level for each issue in the jurisdiction. This is the only institution examined that does not involve party participation.
Direct competition. Direct competition is modeled as a plurality contest between parties.
Agents vote for the party proposing the platform that yields them the highest utility and the jurisdiction wholly adopts the winning party's platform.
Proportional Representation. Under a proportional representation regime, each voter votes for the party proposing the platform that yields her the highest utility. Each party is then 2 See Mueller(2003) , especially Ch 7 for more on simple alternatives to majority rule.
allocated "seats" according to the proportion of votes received. 3 The parties then vote separately and sincerely on each issue in a democratic referendum.
Borda Count. In the Borda count, voters rank the candidate parties from 1 (their favorite) to m, where m is the number of candidates. The votes for each candidate are tallied and the one with the lowest total is declared the winner. The jurisdiction then wholly adopts the winning party's platform.
Hare System. In the Hare system, again voters rank candidate parties from 1 to m. The votes are tallied and the candidate receiving the fewest first place votes is removed from consideration. This process is repeated until only the winning candidate remains. The jurisdiction then wholly adopts the winning party's platform.
Coombs System. The Coombs system is similar to the Hare system, except that instead of removing the candidate with the fewest top ranked votes, the candidate ranked last by the most voters is removed. This procedure is continued until only the winning party remains. The jurisdiction then wholly adopts the winning party's platform.
Instant Runoff Majority Rule. In the instant runoff majority rule system, all voters vote for their favorite party. If any party receives more than half of the votes, they are declared the winner. If not, the top two parties then face each other in a run-off election. As before, the jurisdiction then wholly adopts the winning party's platform.
Parties
For political institutions that assume the involvement of political parties, such as direct competition and proportional representation, a given number of parties compete within each jurisdiction during the electoral process. They stand separate and distinct from the voting populace and lack complete information regarding the preferences of voters within the constituency. They gradually adapt their platform by employing various search mechanisms in an attempt to find the platform that will garner the most votes in the election. The parties seek only reelection, and have no policy preferences of their own. The adaptive technique used by the parties in the present paper is known as the hill-climbing heuristic procedure. Hill-climbing is intended to simulate those parties that "fine-tunes the policy positions of its candidate using polling and focus groups (Kollman, 1998: 144) ."
For the hill-climbing algorithm, the party randomly selects no more than three issues of its current platform to perturb, in order to constrain the new platform to the neighborhood of the original. The party then conducts a poll over the entire constituency of the jurisdiction and determines if the platform will yield it a higher vote total than its current platform. If so, then the new platform becomes the party's platform, if not, the current platform remains. This process continues for eight iterations, at such time the next party is allowed to adapt its platform. Once all parties have adapted their platforms, another round of adaptation may occur. For the results presented in this paper, each party was allowed 5 rounds of adaptations, which means that each party considers a total of 8*5 candidate platforms during every election cycle. At the conclusion of the campaign the general election is held where the parties run on their newly adapted platform. It is important to note that as in Kollman, et al (1998) , the incumbent party does not alter its platform.
Measures of Effectiveness
The purpose of this paper is to present analysis of a model that measures the effectiveness of various political institutions in reference to the provision of public goods and the satisfaction of voters. As in Kollman (1997) , a measure of effectiveness collected in this analysis is average utility of voters in the entire constituency. Those political institutions better able to (a) facilitate the sorting of individuals into groups of relatively similar preferences, or (b) provide a more robust mechanism through which the most intense preferences of voters tend to be met, result in the highest aggregate utility among constituents. Furthermore, the institutions that are relatively less responsive to voter preferences will likely provide local governments with a greater opportunity to leverage whatever monopoly power they may have.
Another measure of the effectiveness of the institutions presented in this paper is that of platform separation among competing parties. This metric is the Euclidean distance between the platform of the incumbent party and the platform of the closest alternative party within its jurisdiction. Consider it a loose surrogate for the incumbent's ability to leverage its monopoly
power. An incumbent party whose closest challenger is relatively far away from finding a superior platform theoretically would be able to extract rent via overly high taxes much easier than an incumbent whose opposition is offering a very competitive platform, in terms of its location on the electoral landscape. However, since the incumbent still retains the "high-ground" relative to competitors they will continue to win future elections.
Separation is also a reasonable measure of responsiveness if the incumbent resides at X I '.
The shaded block in which the incumbent party is able to implement its own agenda is still the same, however, any movement within it is generally to a higher voter utility. Thus, separation is small in this case, but this also corresponds to a generally higher incumbent responsiveness.
However, if the incumbent resides at X I '', separation is a less descriptive measure. While Euclidean distance is relatively higher, the actual difference in elevation between the platforms is the same as at X I '. Thus, any incumbent movement must go upward, helping voters.
The fact that the model in the scenarios considered converge to an equilibrium after a number of electoral cycles gives us confidence that the incumbents have been able to locate themselves in the vicinity of an optimum, and that average separation is a good measure of the challengers' ability to close the gap. To the extent that an institution is either more or less effective at enabling challengers to minimize this gap might allow us to gain an understanding of the manner in which institutions either facilitate or eliminate responsiveness. Just as "number of firms" in a particular market is not sufficient, or in some respects even necessary, to determine the competitiveness of that market, neither is separation a perfect measure of the responsiveness of local governments to the interests of their constituents. However, the idea is to test the effectiveness with which various rules of collective decision making have in regards to enabling competing parties to narrow that gap. In general, if an institution is consistently unable to allow multiple parties to converge at or near the optimum, then that institution will be vulnerable to incumbent parties that are less responsive to the demands of voters.
IV. Results
In this section, findings from various model runs are presented. The model is sensitive to certain changes in parameter values, so whenever possible, parameter values were chosen to emulate Kollman (1998 Kollman ( , 1997 The remaining parameters were varied so as to create an experimental design with 144 design points for each of the seven political institutions under consideration. Each design point was run with 25 replications in order to obtain as small a standard error as possible given time constraints. Each simulation run was drawn out to 30 timesteps, as opposed to 10 in Kollman (1997) because the dynamics of the model, given the richer electoral landscapes of preferences, were such that equilibrium was not always attained in 10 timesteps. However, the results presented are for 10 timesteps unless otherwise indicated.
Common random numbers were also used for each scenario in a further effort to reduce variance between the estimates and enhance comparative ability. (Law and Kelton, 2003) The random number generators that produced the agent's preferences and initial locations were "restarted" at the same point in the psuedo-random number sequence for each scenario. Thus, every scenario was tested against the same sets of agents, and for those scenarios with equal numbers of jurisdictions, the agents start out in the same place each run. For instance, the agents in replication i of the scenario examining direct competition with two parties and three jurisdictions are the exact same agents (same preferences and starting locations) as those in replication i of the scenario examining democratic referendum with three jurisdictions. The agents in replication i of say, proportional representation with eleven jurisdictions are the same agents (same preferences) but obviously do not start out in the same jurisdictions as the previous two examples. The same is true for the randomly adaptive parties, but common random numbers cannot be guaranteed throughout the party adaptation process, so only partial commonality is achieved.
Single Jurisdiction
The results for the single jurisdictional model are shown in Table 2 . Recall that utility is the negative weighted Euclidean distance between an agent's ideal platform and the platform offered in her jurisdiction. The means shown are the average per capita utilities achieved by the particular institution. A one way analysis of variance was conducted on the effect of the institution while blocking the effects of the six different landscapes. The means were then simultaneously compared using Tukey-Kramer multiple comparison technique (Tukey 1953; Kramer 1956 ) at a 0.05 level of significance. The relative performance of the different voting rules was robust across all six electoral landscapes.
The highest performing institution in each case was the democratic referendum. This is consistent with the findings of Kollman (1997: 983) . One difference between the models is the relative performances of Direct Competition and Proportional Representation. In Kollman (1997), Direct Competition (with two parties) performs better than Proportional Representation.
In this case, the two party scenario performs the worst of any institution. The non-standard institutions under consideration, such as the Borda Count, Majority Runoff, etc., do not appear to perform in a manner that is much different from Direct
Competition in a practical sense, though all the alternative institutions do appear to perform consistently better than Direct Competition. Whereas under Direct Competition voters vote for the party they prefer the most, under the nonstandard collective choice institutions, voters rank the candidates so voting rules take into account more information than the more common plurality rule.
Multiple Jurisdictions
The results for the institutions in the three and seven jurisdiction scenario are displayed in Table 3 and Table 4 . As expected, all institutions appear to perform better as the number of jurisdictions increase, due to the agents' ability to relocate into marginally better jurisdictions.
As the number of jurisdictions increase, so too does granularity with which agents are separated into groups. As in Kollman (1997:984) , Proportional Representation appears to be the superior institution. Proportional representation offers the benefits of parties that search the electoral landscape, thus exploring regions where agents' preferences are strongest. The fact that party platforms are not wholly implemented means that the platforms that are ultimately implemented tend to reflect more closely the particular preferences of the voters in the jurisdiction.
Consistent with Kollman (1997) , democratic referendum performs poorly in these scenarios and direct competition performs marginally better. Democratic referendum implements the median issue in each jurisdiction, without regard to the strength of voters'
opinions. This often leads to all jurisdictions settling on platforms that implement levels of government service that are down the center of the range of possible values (i.e. [3, 3, 3, …, 3] ).
Direct competition, to include the alternative rules under consideration, benefit from the adaptively searching parties' abilities to find areas of the electoral landscape that are the highest due to strengths of opinions. These findings are robust with respect to the electoral landscapes. The results for the eleven jurisdiction scenario, displayed in Table 5 , are somewhat anomalous. While Democratic Referendum was the worst performing voting rule in the previous two cases, in this scenario, it performs as well as Proportional Representation. In order to unravel this phenomenon, it is necessary to consider the effect of decreasing the voter to jurisdiction ratio even further. The results for the fifteen jurisdiction scenario are illustrated in Table 6 . As the ratio of voters to jurisdictions decrease, the relative performance of Referendum increases, while the performance of Proportional Representation dramatically decreases. A look at the effect of the electoral landscapes, shown in Tables 7 and 8 shed greater light on this result. Table 7 brings the effect of preference distributions into sharp relief. While Proportional Representation performs better with electoral landscapes with uniform ideologies, Democratic
Referenda performs better with consistent ideologies. The relative effects for the two rules are such that overall, both rules are not substantially different. Table 8 illustrates that as the number of jurisdictions increase, Democratic Referenda once again regains its performance edge over Proportional Representation and Direct
Competition. And consistent with other scenarios, generally all institutions perform better with electoral landscapes with constant ideologies rather than uniform. It will take further investigation to determine why, exactly, the performance of Proportional Representation degrades so rapidly and that of Democratic Referendum improves as the number of jurisdictions increase.
In this section, we have confirmed Kollman et al (1997) overarching conclusion concerning of the stability of the electoral process involving boundedly-rational agents.
However, more particular conclusions regarding the relative performance of collective decision making rules is clearly not robust over various electoral landscapes. While it is ultimately an empirical question as to whether the voters' preferences in a particular set of jurisdictions conform to one or more of the electoral landscapes considered in this model, further investigation of the link between electoral landscape and voting institution might prove fruitful.
Separation
A number of researchers, to include Epple (1981) and Caplan (2001) , model local governments as monopolists who leverage their power to tax to extract rents from the public.
Both of these models assume full and complete information on the part of local government, such that the exact tax rate to charge, the amount of rent to extract, and the potential detrimental effect upon probability of reelection is simply the outcome of an optimization. Caplan artificially imposes a separation effect between parties by using a party preference parameter (2001: 8) . In the current model, parties do not have full information regarding the distribution of voter preferences. They must adaptively search the issue space for platforms they expect will beat their opponents and attract constituents. Thus, parties that arrive in the vicinity of the highest portion of the electoral landscape will likely maintain their position as incumbent for some time. Kollman (1998) indicates that the probability of success for challenger parties decreases as the number of election cycles increases, which would imply that incumbent parties who successfully identify the highest regions of the issue space have the potential to exploit their position of leadership. While the challengers are toiling away following blind alleys and trudging up local optima, the incumbent may presumably increase taxes to the point that voters would prefer the less ideal platform of a challenger but with lower taxes.
While I abstract away from the government's power to tax in this model, a metric that makes for a suitable surrogate for level of political competition is separation. As described above, separation is the Euclidean distance between the incumbent party's platform and that of the closest challenger. I assert that incumbents that face greater political competition will be less able to extract rents from their constituents. Jurisdictions that are highly contested will presumably have little or no separation as incumbent parties and challengers trade victories in the vicinity of the global optimum of the electoral landscape. An incumbent in this scenario would seemingly be less likely to exploit his monopoly position for long before being overtaken by his rivals. Jurisdictions that are less fervently contested will display greater separation. In these jurisdictions, the incumbent quickly moved to the highest areas of the electoral landscape while the challengers are fruitlessly searching other areas. A party in this position would be much more likely to be able to leverage its monopoly position without endangering its likelihood of reelection. Table 7 shows the average minimum separations for the single jurisdiction scenario discussed above. It appears that Direct Competition is relatively less efficient with respect to separation than the other voting institutions. In contrast, Proportional Representation is superior to the other institutions in this regard. The institutions that generally tend to most efficiently improve utility are also the same institutions that encourage low levels of separation. As the number of parties increases, so too does the relative performance of the alternative institutions.
This finding is robust across electoral landscapes. Separation for the eleven jurisdiction scenario is depicted in Table 8 . The performance of the institutions for three and seven jurisdictions to not differ substantively from the single or eleven jurisdiction scenarios. However, the relative performance changes dramatically for the fifteen jurisdiction scenario, as illustrated in Table 9 . Proportional Representation loses its ability to encourage challenger parties to close the gap with incumbents as the number of jurisdictions increase. Interestingly, this break occurs simultaneously with a reduced ability to improve voter utility. While some of the effects of separation between competing parties would, in reality, be mitigated by the fact that the incumbent, or simply the most successful party, is unable to implement its entire platform and typically must involve other parties, it does raise interesting questions about the ability of this institution to perform under these circumstances.
The effect of electoral landscapes on separation levels tends to be opposite of that of their effect on utility. In general, institutions performed better in terms of low separation levels on electoral landscapes that featured uniform ideologies. The effect of electoral landscape on the separation levels achieved via the various voting institutions is illustrated in Table 10 below. In this section, we have endogenously generated the sort of separation that Caplan (2001) asserts is sufficient to allow local governments to leverage monopoly power over their constituents despite the pressure from Tiebout competition. We have found that while the institutions differ in their performance in regard to this measure, the conclusions were not robust over parameter choices such as the number of jurisdictions. Further investigation is required in order to determine the extent of the usefulness of this metric.
V. Limitations and Opportunities for Future Research
There are two conceptual weaknesses to the approach employed in this paper which I intend to address in future work. The first concerns the handling of voter utility and the ex-post aggregation thereof. Voters evaluate the various platforms that each jurisdiction has to offer and selects that which will yield them the highest utility. The problem occurs when the utilities of all voters within a jurisdiction are aggregated and then averaged in an attempt to determine which set of institutions yield the highest percapita utility values. This methodology presumes that utility may be cardinally measured that the amounts "possessed" by individuals may be objectively compared.
An alternative measure of effectiveness should (1) not require interpersonal utility comparison between agents or assume the existence of cardinal utility, and (2) continue to allow agents to make ordinal choices regarding the expected satisfaction/welfare to be attained by living in a particular jurisdiction. Randomly assigning to each agent various ideal points for the issues under consideration is a reasonable way to model this component of an artificial agent's rational choice. The agents' calculus would not differ if they were imbued with only ordinal data with which to make their decisions. An alternative measure of effectiveness might be the number, and rank, of issues that agents are able to 'satisfy' through their choice of jurisdiction.
Modeling the circumstances under which these agents conduct their activities, and then aggregating results in order to compare the characteristics of political institutions may be reasonable within the confines of an artificial society as the one presented. In reality, the subjective nature of utility prevents comparing different levels of utility across individuals.
The other conceptual weakness is more philosophical. There are two ways to conceptually frame the relationship between the government and individuals in society. The first is the more common perspective of the state as a unitary being that stands outside the market, and intervenes as necessary to correct perceived deficiencies. Wagner (2007) describes this as the disjunctive perspective. It is disjunctive in the sense that the state is assumed separate from the society of individuals that it governs. In applying these notions to the analysis of public finance, the implication is that disjunctive analysis treats the government as a monolithic entity that pursues goals with singular focus. The alternative paradigm is a conjunctive perspective, which acknowledges that even the state exhibits the qualities of a spontaneous order. "Within the framework of a conjunctive political economy, the state is not a sentient being that intervenes into the market, but rather an institutionalized process or forum within which people interact with one another (Wagner, 2007, p.14) ." In Wagner's analysis, there exists a market square for private transactions and a public square for collective transactions where private property and residual claimancy is simply absent or attenuated. Individuals who seek to start an enterprise may select either forum to build the necessary relationships.
In its present implementation, the model embraces the disjunctive perspective. Parties are not simply external anthropomorphic agents that seek election victory or particular political outcomes. They are comprised of individuals who join together to pursue common goals in the political market. This model may prove fruitful for examining the circumstances that encourage or discourage formation of these groups. In addition, rather than selecting a platform, parties might select an individual from within their ranks to run as a candidate. To truly adhere to the conjunctive approach, parties could emerge spontaneously, as voters discover like-minded individuals and attempt to field candidates in order to implement the parties' preferred platform.
This model holds great potential for examining the manner in which both individuals and groups (parties, special interest groups, etc) learn through the course of participating in political markets. (See de Marchi (2003) , for a model in which neither voters nor parties possess complete information.) The initial step in analyzing this process is to relax assumptions regarding full and complete information on the part of agents. Similarly, agents could conduct a process of learning the exact platforms on which the parties were campaigning. Simulating the effect of political advertising would represent an additional dimension to the learning process. In addition, as the model is currently implemented, the parties poll their entire constituencies in order to ascertain their opinions regarding candidate platforms. Giving parties access to a random subset of the constituency would greatly limit the speed with which they are able to find the highest areas of the electoral landscape and correspond more closely with the ability of parties to ascertain the preferences of voters in reality. Finally, parties may be modified to hold ideologies so that they don't simply act as vote maximizers.
Other authors have theorized about the ability for local governments to extract rents through the use of property taxation. When fully capitalized in the sale price of housing, individuals may be unable to constrain local governments from exploiting their monopoly-like positions. Extending the model to include a public finance dimension would facilitate analysis of a number of different methods of taxation.
VI. Conclusion
Agent-based simulation is a relatively new tool in the social sciences, and it was more recently introduced to the field of political economy. The model presented in this paper applies this modeling technique in an attempt to gain insight into the efficiencies with which political institutions are able to sort voters by preferences. The technique shows potential for more rigorous analysis of political, fiscal, and economic competition on the part of local governments in the future. Components of previous analyses were confirmed, such as the inherent stability of the electoral process under the circumstances considered, but a number of conclusions regarding the relative performance of various institutions appear to be contingent upon the particular electoral landscape under consideration. It is also clear that various institutions perform better than others in regard to the extent to which they facilitate the reduction in the separation between the competing parties. In addition, the non-standard voting rules such as the Borda Count and Coombs System perform well in this regard, especially in the scenarios with more jurisdictions.
A number of avenues for future research were discussed and appear fruitful.
